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"Man does not pursue happiness. Only the English-
man does that." 
-Nietzsche 
Twilight of the Idols 1 
Introduction 
Many philosophers believe there is a principle of practical reason 
that directs the rational agent to maximize the satisfaction of his own 
desires and interests. I will call this "the egoistic principle," and the 
person who believes in it an "egoist." Some philosophers believe that 
conformity to the egoistic principle is equivalent to the pursuit of hap-
piness, or- if these are different - to the pursuit of the individual's 
own good. In the social sciences, especially economics, it is widely be-
lieved that some form of the egoistic principle is both normative and 
descriptive: that is, that it tells us not only how we should act, but also 
how, at least in dear-headed moments, we do act. Philosophers who 
endorse this view sometimes take the egoistic principle to be definitive 
of practical rationality, and therefore suppose that the way to show that 
we have "reason to be moral" is to show that conformity to moral re-
quirements will somehow maximize the satisfaction of our own desires 
and interests. 
This is not, of course, how the rationality of morality has been un-
derstood in either the Kantian or the rationalist tradition. Both Kant 
and Sidg\\ick, for instance, claimed that the moral principle is a prin-
ciple of reason in its own right.2 But they also accepted the idea that 
something like the egoistic principle is a normative rational principle. 3 
For Sidg\vick, the egoistic principle is a rival to the moral principle of 
utility. Kant's various remarks about the nature of happiness are not 
entirely consistent, but at one point he defines it as "the sum of satis-
faction of all inclinations" (G4: 399).4•5 Kant thinks that the rationality 
of pursuing one's own happiness is represented by the imperative of 
prudence, which he sometimes appears to believe governs the conduct 
both of wicked people all the time and of good people once the de-
mands of morality are satisfied.6 But both those who think that the 
egoistic principle is definitive of rationality and those who think there 
is a separate rational principle of morality commonly believe that the 
egoistic principle has an advantage over the moral one. The egoistic 
principle, they suppose, more obviously meets the requirement ofin-
temalism- that is, the requirement that practical reasons must be ca-
pable of motivating us- since the egoistic principle essentially tells us 
to do what we want most. Even Kant believed that imperatives of pru-
dence are hypothetical imperatives whose normativity can be established 
just as easily, and on essentially the same grounds, as that of instrumental 
principles. Contemporary egoists go one step further, and suppose 
that egoism is an expression of the instrumental principle itself. Ego-
ism sees itself as a naturalistic view, which requires no extravagant as-
sumptions about the metaphysics of the good or the possibility of pure 
practical reason. 
In this paper I will present some reasons for doubting these familiar 
views. In Part I, I will examine some possible views about the norma-
tive foundations of the egoistic principle. I will argue that the view that 
egoism is a form of instrumentalism is based on a pair of false as-
sumptions about the nature of practical rationality. When we aban-
don these assumptions, it becomes clear that the idea of a maximum 
of satisfaction is a substantive conception of the good. Egoism, I will 
argue, is essentially a rationalistic position: its normativity is grounded 
in a non-natural conception of the good, and its psychology requires 
the possibility of motivation by pure practical reason. In Part II, I will 
take a closer look at the content of this conception of the good. I will 
ask what exactly we must mean by a "maximum of satisfaction" if that 
idea is to ground a principle which is at once both plausibly rational 
and distinctively egoistic. I will argue that the relevant conception of 
the good is one recognizably grounded in the psychological assump-
tions of classical eighteenth-century British empiricism. Egoism there-
fore requires a familiar empiricist conception of the good, whose 
normativity can be defended only on rationalist grounds. It does not 
therefore follow that it is an incoherent position. It does however fol-
low that it cannot be defended on any of the grounds which egoists 
usually offer in its favor. 
I. Nonnative Foundations for the Egoistic Principle 
I.llnstrumental Egoism 
Not everyone believes that any argument needs to be made for the 
normativity of the egoistic principle. Characteristically, philosophers 
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and social scientists who believe that the egoistic principle is defini-
tive of practical rationality also consider themselves to be instrumen-
talists about practical reason. That is, they endorse the view that the 
only principle of practical reason is the principle that directs us to take 
the means to our ends. For shorthand, I am going to call this position 
"instrumental egoism" and the person who believes it an "instrumen-
tal egoist." Instrumental egoists usually also believe that the instrumental 
principle itself is either obviously normative or does not need to be 
normative, since we are in fact motivated to act in accordance with it. 
Elsewhere I have argued, as against that last view, that the instrumen-
tal principle is normative and that an account of its normative force 
is therefore required. 7 
However that may be, the view that egoism is a form of instru-
mentalism is incoherent on its surface. The instrumental principle tells 
us only that we must take the means to our ends; it says nothing what-
ever about what our ends should be. It therefore does not say either 
that we ought to pursue a maximum of satisfaction, or that we ought 
to prefer that maximum to the satisfaction of particular desires in 
cases of conflict. Since egoism requires us both to pursue a specific 
end and to prefer that end to all others, it has to go beyond the the-
ory that all practical reasons are instrumental. 
But instrumental egoists deny that the egoistic principle requires 
you to pursue a specific end. Happiness in the egoist's sense is sup-
posedly not a specific end: it is just the maximum realization of the 
ends you already have. And more generally, all that the principles of 
rational choice do is apply some formal structure to the ends, what-
ever they might be, that are fed into its formulas. It is neutral about 
the good- or so its defenders claim. 
I think that there is a mistake here like the one thatjohn Stuart 
Mill makes in his proof of the principle of utility. Mill says that the 
only thing that 'proves' that anything is desirable and therefore good 
is that it is desired. Each person desires his own happiness, so the sum 
of everyone's happiness is desirable and therefore good.11 But, we may 
object, at least for all we know, no one desires the sum of everyone's 
happiness, so if only desire makes for desirability, what makes the sum 
desirable? Mill wants to mean that each part of it is desired, by the per-
son whose happiness it isY But of course a maximum does not include 
its parts in that way: maximizing happiness is not like adding one acre 
of ground to another that adjoins it. Conflicts are possible, and if the 
calculation turns out so, I may have to sacrifice my happiness in order 
to maximize the total, and then where is my part? In the same way, if 
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my happiness consists in the maximum satisfaction of my desires, it is 
unlikely to include the satisfaction of each of my desires. And just as 
the individual person whose happiness is sacrificed for the sake of over-
all utility seems to have some right to protest, so also the individual 
desire whose satisfaction is sacrificed for the sake of overall happiness 
seems to have some right to protest There are moments when the ques-
tion "why should I be prudent?" is as much in need of an answer as its 
more famous cousin. 
Why then does the instrumental egoist suppose that it is possible 
to believe both in instrumentalism and in egoism? How can he even 
imagine that these two positions are compatible? The instrumental 
egoist has to believe both that people do in fact desire maximum sat-
isfaction and also that no real conflict can possibly arise between a per-
son's desire for this maximum and her desires for particular things. 
One way to reach that conclusion is to suppose that satisfaction itself 
is the only thing which people want for its own sake, and that all de-
sired objects are wanted as mere means to satisfaction. That is the view 
famously attacked as incoherent by Bishop Butler, on the grounds that 
an object cannot give us satisfaction unless we want it for its own sake.10 
I propose to set it aside here, not merely on the good Bishop's authority, 
but also because it so obviously involves a substantive, and controver-
sial, conception of the good. I believe that the more common as-
sumption behind instrumental egoism is that what a person really 
wants, deep down, just are the things that are consistent with or part 
of her happiness. According to this view, once you have understood 
that something would be detrimental to your happiness, you will cease 
to desire it. Our desires, when we are clearheaded, accord with pru-
dence. 
With that idea in mind, the instrumental egoist treats the possibility 
that someone might desire something inconsistent with her happiness 
as if it were exactly on a par with the possibility that she might mis-
calculate or simply make a factual error. Suppose someone mistakes 
white vinegar for vodka. "You do nor really want to drink that," we say 
to her; and she does not; we are absolutely right. The instrumental 
egoist must suppose that it is true in just that way that the addict does 
not really want the heroin, or that the angry person does nor really want 
to break the window, or that the adulterer does not really want to have 
the affair that will destroy his marriage. In these cases, the instrumental 
egoist must say, the person's mind is so clouded by addiction, rage, or 
lust that he is unable to identify what he really wants. 
But considered as a psychological hypothesis, the idea that human 
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beings "really" have all and only these domesticated desires seems not 
only false but hilarious. As Bishop Butler wrote in his Sennons: 
Men daily, hourly sacrifice the greatest known interest to fancy, 
inquisitiveness, love, or hatred, or any vagrant inclination. 11 
Someone who says the addict does not "really want" the heroin must 
be using "want" in some specialized sense, for in one familiar sense he 
very obviously does want it. 
In my view, if we are tempted to think that the addict does not re-
ally want the heroin, that temptation must be based on our belief that 
it is irrational for him to want it, together with a certain conception of 
rationality. It is the hallmark of a rational agent. one may suppose, 
that his desires are directed and reshaped by his rational deliberations. 
So if the addict were thinking rationally, he would not want the heroin. 
But even if that is right, we cannot allow the egoist to posit that this 
reshaping has happened before the deliberation ever starts: that is, that 
his "real" desires somehow already accord with the results of his delib-
erations. 
This is the first of the two false assumptions about practical ratio-
nality that I mentioned at the outset of this essay: the view that prac-
tical reasoning really just serves to uncover our "real" desires. On this 
assumption, what we call "practical reason" is actually a form of theo-
retical reasoning about our psychology. This view is not one to which 
people openly subscribe, but rather an unconscious assumption which 
shows up in the way they argue, and we will see it at work again later 
on. 11 But practical deliberation is not aimed at psychological knowl-
edge: its conclusions are not just reminders of what we already want, 
deep down. It is rather a way of determining what is good for us, what 
we ought to want. 
In any case, the belief that it is irrational for someone to want 
heroin cannot be based on the instrumental principle, since is a belief 
about what his ends should be. So if the instrumental egoist asserts 
that the addict does not "really want" the heroin, there must be a sub-
stantive view about what it is rational to want hiding under the cover 
of that word "really." This is what enables the instrumental egoist to 
imagine that the only really practical reasoning going on here is in-
strumental. 
This is even clearer when the egoist reverts to the use of that dan-
gerous word "interests." Until now I have been talking about desires 
and interests as if these ideas were interchangeable, but in fact this is 
correct only if we take the word "interest" in a rather peculiar sense. 
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When we say that someone "has a desire" for something, we are natu-
rally understood as talking about an item in his natural psychology, an 
urge, or an attraction, or a disposition to find the object pleasurable, 
or something of that sort.13 We may then see the principle of maxi-
mizing satisfaction as a principle of naturalistic construction, which ap-
plies a maximizing formula to certain items regarded as naturally or 
prima facie good, with the individual's happiness or overall good com-
ing out as the result of the exercise. Let me call that result "the max-
imum com possible set" of the objects of desire. The items from which 
the set is constructed must have some sort of prima facie normative 
weight -given by how strongly you desire them, for example - so that 
we can perform a maximizing operation. But they do not yet have what 
we might call a normative ranking- that is, we have not yet decided 
which of them you ought to pursue in preference to which. It is the 
point of the maximizing operation to assign them a normative rank-
ing. It is important not to get confused about this: the prima facie 
weights do not settle the question of the normative ranking, since, for 
instance, a very strong desire may have to be suppressed (given a low 
or negative ranking) for the sake of maximizing the total. Now when 
we say that someone "has an interest" in something, we may not be re-
ferring to a natural psychological item, or at least not to one not yet 
normatively ranked, for the phrase "has an interest" is also used in a 
way that already implies a normative ranking. In this sense, when we 
say that someone "has an interest" in something, we imply that reason 
favors his pursuing it over other options. If we suppose that reason favors 
the satisfaction of those desires whose objects fit together into the max-
imum compossible set, then those are the desires in whose satisfaction 
you "have an interest," and the idea of maximizing the satisfaction of 
your interests just says the same thing twice over. This is why the word 
"interest" is dangerous. The normative use of the word "interest" gives 
the formulation "maximizing the satisfaction of one's interests" an agree-
ably rational ring, but in fact the egoist cannot mean "interest" in this 
normative sense without reducing his principle to an empty tautology. 
Some rational choice theorists like to use the word "preference" 
(maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences) but in my view this is 
even more misleading, for "preference" carries the idea of a compar-
ative ranking on its surface. Of course it may not be a comparative nor-
mative ranking, but if that is not what it refers to then it must refer to 
a comparative natural ranking, perhaps one based on the compara-
tive strength of desire. So why not say so? If the idea of egoism is that 
we can generate the notion of a person's good or of his happiness sim-
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ply by performing a maximizing operation on some naturally existing 
items, it is really better to keep this clearly before our minds by call-
ing those items "desires." But if we stick to "desire" and keep in view 
that we are talking about some natural psychological items, then the 
claim that a person's "real desires" are directed to all and only those 
things which are consistent with his happiness seems patently false. 
At this juncture it may be useful to review the points I have just 
made. Instrumental egoism is inconsistent on its surface. I have sug-
gested that what enables people even to imagine that it might be right 
is that they make an implicit assumption - the assumption that peo-
ple "really want" the things that make them happy. that is, that accord 
with their maximal satisfaction. Reasoning about how to get what you 
("really") want and reasoning about how to promote your maximal 
satisfaction therefore coincide. This assumption, I have argued, is in 
turn based on a false view of the role of practical reason - the view 
that practical deliberation "uncovers" our real desires- together, of 
course, with certain background assumptions about what those real 
desires must be. 
But there is a second and even more serious problem with the as-
sumption behind instrumental egoism. If it were true that we really 
desired all and only those things that are consistent with our happi-
ness, egoistically understood, then we would automatically conform to 
the dictates of the egoistic principle, not because it is rational to do 
so, but because we would naturally want to. If someone did act against 
his own best interests, this would not be because he failed to conform 
his will to the egoistic principle, but rather because he was making some 
mistake in his calculations, and did not understand where his inter-
ests really lay. But if this were so, what need would there be for an ego-
istic principle of practical reason? 
The point I am making turns on the distinction between making 
a mistake and true practical irrationality- that is, violating a principle 
of practical reason. When a person's action is based on a mistake, the 
person does the wrong thing, objectively speaking, but that does not 
show that the person is truly irrational. A person who adds a little dry 
vermouth and some olives to glass of white vinegar, believing it to be 
a glass of vodka, is not doing anything irrational, for by her own lights 
the action makes perfectly good sense. There is nothing amiss with 
her motivation, nothing, if I may put it this way, wrong with her will: 
it is only her factual judgment that needs correcting. According to the 
assumption behind instrumental egoism, a person who desires to take 
heroin must suppose that it is consistent with his happiness to take it; 
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othenvise he could not even imagine that he really desires it. But that 
means he is conforming to the egoistic principle, by his own lights. His 
problem therefore is not true practical irrationality, but simply mistaken 
judgment. The mistake may have its source in his addiction -it may 
somehow be caused by the addiction - but what the addiction causes 
is not practical irrationality; it is bad theoretical judgment. But if peo-
ple cannot ever be guilty of violating the egoistic principle by their own 
lights, then it is not a rational principle. It is simply a description of 
the inevitable effect that a certain kind of judgment has on the human 
will: prove to us that something is contrary to our happiness and we 
will forthwith cease to desire it. 
This is the second of the two false assumptions about practical ra-
tionality that stand behind instrumental egoism: the view that rational 
principles are essentially descriptions of the effects that certain judgments 
have on the will. This assumption is also behind the commonly held 
view, mentioned earlier, that the instrumental principle is either al-
ready normative or does not need to be normative, because people ac-
tually are motivated to take the means to their ends. According to this 
view, if someone fails to take the means to an end, we are en tided to 
conclude either that he does not really want the end after all, or that 
he is making a mistake about how to promote it. But prove to him that 
the action will promote his end, and he will forthwith be motivated to 
do it. So no one ever violates the requirement ofinstrumental reason 
by his own lights. The principle of instrumental reason turns out to 
be essentially a description of the effect that means/ end judgments have 
on the human will. 14 
The trouble with this conception of rationality is that it cannot sup-
port the normative use of "ought." For according to this view, ifl say 
to you "you really ought to see a dentist about that tooth" all that I mean 
-all- is that if you came to understand that a visit to the dentist is es-
sential to the achievement of an end requisite for your happiness, you 
would in fact be motivated to go. The rational judgment is not really 
a recommendation, but rather a sort of hypothetical prediction. And 
it is not that I predict you would be motivated to go if you understood 
that going would promote your happiness because you would then see 
that you have a reason to go. It is not tllat, for on this view the claim 
that you have a reason to go just amounts to the claim that if you made 
the judgment you would in fact be motivated to go. So it turns out 
that what looks like the normative "ought" is really just a version of the 
"ought" of expectation. On this view, saying of someone on the brink 
of toothache that he ought to go to the dentist is exacdy like saying of 
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someone who is late that he ought to be home by now. Given human 
nature, we would have predicted that the person on the brink of 
toothache would be motivated to go to the dentist; just as given the 
distance, we would have predicted that the person who left the office 
an hour ago would be home about now. If these predictions turn out 
false we know that something has gone wrong. But what has gone wrong 
can no more properly be described as a failure of practical reason in 
the first case than in the second. 
The inadequacy of the view is clear from this fact: there may be 
many principles which accurately describe the way human beings are 
characteristically motivated. And this conception of rationality leaves 
us with no way of distinguishing which ones are principles of reason 
and which ones are not. We can reliably predict that people will be mo-
tivated to take the means to their ends. But suppose that we also 
could reliably predict that when criticized people will cry and stamp 
their feet. We would not be tempted to think that it follows that such 
behavior is rationally required of us. 
1.2 The Imperative of Prudence 
We might at first think that a better account of the normativity of 
the egoistic principle is available in the Groundworlc of the Metaphysics 
of Morals. Kant recognized both that the imperative of prudence, as 
he called it, is not the same as the instrumental principle and that it 
stands in need of a normative foundation. In the second section of 
the Groundwork, Kant proposes that there are three kinds of practical 
imperatives. First there arc rules of skill or technical imperatives- that 
is, instrumental principles. Second there are counsels of prudence or 
pragmatic imperatives, which direct us to pursue our own happiness, 
identified, as I mentioned earlier, with "the sum of satisfaction of all 
inclinations" (G 4:399). And finally of course there arc commands of 
morality, or categorical imperatives (G 4:416). 
Kant appears to leave room for the normativity of prudence, for in 
the Groundwork at least he seems to believe that we do not inevitably 
follow imperatives of prudence by our own lights. One of the four ex-
amples he uses in the first section of the Groundwork to explicate the 
difference between acting from duty and acting from inclination con-
cerns a man who is tempted to imprudence; when prudence fails to 
govern him, morality steps in. Kant says: 
To assure one's happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for, want 
of satisfaction with one's condition ... could easily become a great 
temptation to transgression of duty. But in addition, all people have 
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already ... the strongest and deepest inclination to happiness be. 
cause it is just in this idea that all inclinations unite in one sum. 
However, the precept of happiness is often so constituted that 
it greatly infringes upon some inclinations, and yet one can form 
no determinate and sure concept of the sum of satisfaction of 
all inclinations under the name of happiness. Hence it is not 
to be wondered at that a single inclination, determinate both 
as to what it promises and as to the time in which it can be sat-
isfied, can often outweigh a fluctuating idea, and that a man -
for example one suffering from the gout- can choose to enjoy 
what he likes and put up with what he can since, according to 
his calculations, on this occasion at least he has not sacrificed 
the enjoyment of the present moment to the perhaps ground-
less expectation of a happiness that is supposed to lie in health. 
But even in this case, when the general inclination to happiness 
did not determine his will ... there is still left over here ... a law, 
namely to promote his happiness not from inclination but from 
duty; and it is then that his conduct first has properly moral worth. 
(G 4:399) 
Unfortunately- but interestingly- the example is muddled. Kant por-
trays the man as falling into doubt about whether the imperative of 
prudence that forbids the unhealthy treat is well-founded or not, being 
based on "the perhaps groundless expectation of a happiness that is 
supposed to lie in health." Obviously, if there were good reason to 
doubt whether forgoing the unhealthy treat is a means to happiness, 
then the man's resistance to the imperative that forbids the unhealthy 
treat would to that extent be rationaL And in that case the indirect duty 
to pursue one's happiness would no more forbid the unhealthy treat 
than the imperative of prudence does. It seems likely that what Kant 
is really thinking is that the man has a tendency to rationalization. "Oh, 
how does anyone know that health really leads to happiness anyway?" 
he says to himself, licking his lips at the thought of the treat. And then 
the thought of his duty stiffens his resolve. Even then it is not clear 
how exactly the example is supposed to work, since the rationalization 
works against the thought of duty in the same way it works against the 
thought of prudence. But at all events the case does show that Kant 
thought one could resist the normative force of prudence when that 
force "infringes upon some inclinations." And indeed this is neces-
sary to his account, for Kant recognizes that a principle cannot be nor-
mative unless it is possible to violate it. Imperatives are addressed to 
creatures who can violate them and so they are normative: 
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All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this 
the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that by its sub-
jective constitution is not necessarily determined by it. .. They 
say that to do or omit something would be good, but they say 
it to a will that does not always do something just because it is 
represented to it that it would be good to do that thing. (G 4:413) 
How then is the normativity of prudence to be established? 
Rules of skill, or principles of instrumental reason, are hypotheti-
cal imperatives, taking the form "if you will this, then you must also 
will that." According to Kant their normative force is based on the prin-
ciple that "whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has de-
cisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to 
it that are within his power" (G 4:417). This principle, Kant claims, is 
analytic, because "in the volition of an object as my effect, my causal-
ity as acting cause, that is, the usc of means, is already thought" (G 4:417). 
To will something is not merely to desire it, but to set yourself to bring 
it about - that is, to cause it - and so willing something essentially in-
volves determining yourself to use the means to it. 
Imperatives of prudence, Kant claims, arc also hypothetical im-
peratives, arising from the fact that we necessarily will happiness. He 
says: 
There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual 
in the case of all rational beings ... and therefore one purpose 
that they not merely coultl have but that we can safely presup-
pose they all actually do have by a natural necessity, and that pur-
pose is happiness. (G 4:415) 
And therefore: 
If only it were as easy to give a determinate concept of happi-
ness, imperatives of prudence would agree entirely with those 
of skill and would be just as analytic. For it could be said, here 
just as there: who wills the end also wills (necessarily in conformity 
with reason) the sole means to it that are within his control. (G 
4:417-418) 
We run into problems, however, when we try to make out what Kant 
could possibly mean when he claims that we "have" the end of happi-
ness by a natural necessity. He could mean either that we necessarily 
wiUhappiness, or that we necessarily desire it, but there are difficulties 
either way. On the one hand, if he means that we necessarily will hap-
pines.o;- that is, we necessarily choose it, when no moral obligation pre-
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vents us- the claim seems to be contrary to his own views about our 
essential freedom of the choice of ends. In the Metaphysics of Morals 
Kant says: 
An end is the object of the choice (of a rational being) , through 
the representation of which choice is determined to bring this 
object about.- Now, I can indeed be constrained by others to 
perform actions that are directed as means to an end, but I can 
never be constrained by others to have an end; only I can make 
something my end. (MM 6:381) 
Here Kant argues that adopting an end is an internal action to which 
we cannot be compelled; hence it must be a free act. Although his 
contrast here is between freedom and constraint by other people, the 
claim that "only I can make something my end" seems equally to ex-
clude ends determined by nature. More generally, Kant's argument 
for the moral law starts from the definition of a free will as one that is 
not determined by any law outside itself, and involves the premise that 
we must regard ourselves, insofar as we are rational, as having free wills. 
We choose maxims for ourselves autonomously, and our ends are cho-
sen as part of our maxims. The idea that we necessarily will happiness 
seems inconsistent with all of this. 15 
On the other hand, if all Kant means is that we cannot help but de-
sire happiness, it is puzzling that he singles out a special sort ofimperative 
to guide our pursuit of this desired end. For in the first place, there 
are many things, most notably the satisfaction of our physical needs, 
which we cannot help but desire, but Kant does not single out special 
imperatives for them. In the second place, and more importantly, mere 
desires for ends do not support hypothetical imperatives, which are 
based on the principle that whoever wills an end wills the means, and 
therefore cannot be derived from mere desires. Desiring an end does 
not analytically involve the thought of "my causality as an acting cause," 
in the way that willing an end does. And in the third place, the mere 
desire for happiness would be only one desire among others, which would 
have to compete for our attention with other, more particular, desires 
and ends. In fact, even if Kant did have an argument to show that we 
necessarily will happiness as an end, it would not automatically follow 
that we should always rationally prefer it to more particular ends; nor 
does Kant give any argument at all to that effect. Happiness would at 
most be established as one end among others. And if there were a prin-
ciple of practical reason, an imperative, directing us both to have hap-
piness as an end and to prefer happiness to every other end, that 
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principle would seem to lie somewhere in between Kant's two categories 
of hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Unlike a hypothetical im-
perative, it would command us to pursue a certain end no matter what 
else we happened to want; but unlike a categorical one, it would hold 
only conditionally, since our pursuit of this end would have to give way 
to moral considerations.16 
Of course Kant might after all mean that we always do pursue hap-
piness, by our own lights, at least when not forbidden by duty. Later 
he seems to come around to this view, for in the Metapllysics of Morals, 
after arguing that "what everyone wants unavoidably, of his own accord, 
does not come under the concept of duty" (MM 6:386), Kant says: 
Since it is unavoidable for human nature to wish for and seek 
happiness, that is, satisfaction with one's state, so long as one 
is assured of its lasting, this is not an end that is also a duty. (MM 
6: 387) 17 
But if we cannot have a duty to pursue our own happiness because we 
inevitably do pursue it, then neither can there be an imperative of pru-
dence, for the same reason. So this leaves us back where we were. 
I.J A Kanlian Conception of Rationality 
Perhaps it will seem that in making this argument I am rejecting 
the very idea of a theory of rationality that is at once both normative 
and descriptive. For I am insisting that if we necessarily do conform 
to a certain principle, then it cannot be normative. But the lesson need 
only be that that correlation must be understood in a different way. 
We can suppose that rc1tional principles are descriptive of rational 
procedures or activities, and of human beings insofar as we engage in 
those procedures or activities. This is a view most naturally associated 
with Kant. Kant's account of the imperative of prudence in the Ground-
work does not yet, in my view, express his mature conception of ratio-
nality.18 
Kant views reason as the active aspect or dimension of the human 
mind, that is, as its power of self-determination. The principles of rea-
son describe the active contribution of the mind to belief and to ac-
tion. They are procedures we follow in determining our beliefs and 
actions, insofar as we are mtional. A comparison may help to show why 
this makes them both normative and descriptive. The principles of 
English grammar are both normative and descriptive because they de-
scribe procedures we follow in constructing our sentences insofar as 
we are speaking English. 19 To speak English is essentially to be guided 
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by those principles; we may say that being guided by those principles 
is constitutive of speaking English. In the same way, the most general 
function of the mind is to think, and to think is essentially to be guided 
by the principles of logic. According to Kant, the mind is also faced 
with the more specific task of constructing a unified conception ofthe 
world from the phenomena, and to do this is to be guided by the prin-
ciples of the understanding. And the mind is faced with the task of 
choice or volition, of the determination of our actions; and to will is 
to be guided by the principles of practical reason. 
The important thing to emphasize about this conception of ratio-
nality is that rational principles describe activities: they tell us what 
the rational mind as such does with certain items that are given to it, 
rather than merely describing the effect which those items will have 
on the mind. The principles of logic and the canons of evidence de-
scribe what the thinker as such does with the incoming evidence: ar-
riving at a belief through reasoning is an active process, a process by 
which the mind determines itself to a conclusion. Rational principles 
may be seen as directions in the most literal way. Given Pand if P then 
Qinfer ~ modus ponens is a direction for thinking. We can predict 
with some confidence that the rational mind when confronted with 
this argument will believe Q, but it is certainly not inevitable. And if 
the mind does believe Qwhen faced with the argument, that is an ef 
feet of its rationality, not the essence of its rationality. Inferring Qfrom 
P and if P then Q is no more the same as merely being caused to be-
lieve it than jumping off a cliff is the same as merely being caused to 
fall off ofit, for the aspect of self-determination is missing. What makes 
your beliefs logical is not that they conform to the rules of logic, for 
you could believe P, Q, and If P then Q, and never notice any connec-
tion between them. Nor is it that believing the premises causes you to 
believe the conclusion, for this too could happen without your notice. 
What makes your belieflogical is that you put the two premises together 
in the way required by modus ponens, and so cause yourself to believe 
it. In the same way, the principles of practical reason describe what 
the will as such does with certain items, say beliefs and desires, that are 
given to it. Volition, the determination of our actions, is an active proc-
ess, a process by which we cause ourselves to act. It is not just some-
thing that happens in us or to us. The instrumental principle, for 
instance, on this view, is an instruction for willing: if you are to will the 
end, rather than merely wishing for it or wanting it, and these are the 
means, then you must determine yourself to take these. 
Now it may seem as if there is something paradoxical about this con-
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ception of rationality. The principles of practical reason govern ac-
tion. Yet I am claiming that reasoning itself must be seen as a kind of 
action, in order to capture the element of self-determination that is 
essential to volition. If reasoning must be seen as a kind of action, what 
captures the element of self-determination that is essential to reason-
ing itself? Do we need some deeper sort of rational activity that in turn 
captures that? A regress obviously threatens. We are here confronting 
one of the deepest problems of philosophy, the problem of identify-
ing the exact nature of the self-determination that distinguishes actions 
and activities from mere events. This problem rests behind the per-
sistent philosophical temptation to try to reduce both action and rea-
son, as forms of self-determination, to special forms of causation. One 
expression of that temptation is what I have identified as the second 
false assumption abom rationality, the view that the principles of rea-
son merely describe the effects that certain judgments have on the will 
or the mind. 
Kant offers us a way to block the regress. To explain it, it will be 
helpful to distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of the 
Kantian conception of rationality. According to both versions, the prin-
ciples of reason are principles of rational activity, principles that de-
scribe the mind's active contribution to thinking or volition. The 
stronger version adds a further thought, namely, the thought that we 
can derive the content of the principles of reason from this very con-
ception of what they are. The principles of reason, on this view, are 
not just principles that direct us to do this or that, but principles whose 
content captures the very essence of activity or self-determination. 
Consider once more the way I formulated the instrumental principle 
a moment ago: If you are to will the end, rather than merely wishing 
for it or wanting it, then you must determine yourself to take the 
means. Seen this way, the instrumental principle is intended to cap-
ture something about the very essence of volition, in particular what 
makes volition different from mere desire. You arc not willing the end 
at all unless you determine yourself to cause the end to come about, 
that is, to use the means. The categorical imperative, in its universal 
law formulation, wears this thought on its face, for what it tells us to 
do is to give ourselves a law- that is to say, what it tells us to do is to 
determine ourselves. The Kantian arguments for these principles are 
meant to establish that you succeed in exercising the self-determina-
tion that is essence of volition only to the extent that you follow these 
principles. 20 
Now let me return to a point I made earlier. I argued that if we 
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support instrumental egoism with the view that people do not "really 
want" things that are inconsistent with their happiness, we must say that 
people who pursue ends which are in fact inconsistent with their hap-
piness are guilty of mistake, of bad theoretical judgment. But I also 
said that the mistake might be caused by the agent's condition - by 
addiction or rage or lust, for instance. Whereas the instrumental ego-
ist regards these conditions as causes of confusion, making people un-
able to see what they really want. the Kantian will say that they are, 
directly, causes of true practical irrationality- or to put the same point 
another way, conditions that undermine our power of self-determination. 
We do not have to suppose, as the instrumental egoist does, that the 
addict's condition makes it impossible for him to undmtand that there 
is good reason for him not to take heroin. We can say that his addic-
tion makes it impossible, or maybe just hard, for him to guide himself 
in accordance with that reason. Or rather, if we do imagine that he 
says to himself, at least at very the moment when he takes the stuff, that 
it is consistent with his happiness- for I am inclined to think that some-
thing like that does happen -we can see that as rationalization. That 
is, if he says to himselfthatjust now, this time,just once, it really is good 
for him, or anyway not bad, to take the drug, we can see that as an at-
tempt to conceal his failure of self-determination or self-control from 
himself, rather than seeing it as a mistake that causes behavior which 
is not actually irrational by his own lights. So the order of what hap-
pens is different. The instrumental egoist says that the addiction 
causes an error of judgment which in tum leads to conduct which only 
looks practically irrational from the outside, but which is not really so 
by the addict's own lights. The Kantian says instead that the addiction 
causes genuinely, inwardly, practically irrational conduct- causes a de-
fect in the will -which the agent then scrambles to rationalize by the 
invocation of the mistaken belief. 
Apart from the fact that this second way of seeing the situation is 
consistent with the possibility of practical reason, while the first way is 
not, the second way seems to me to be getting things the right way 
around. In fact there is room here for an interesting account of what 
rationalization is and why it is so pervasive. Because we are self-con-
scious we are faced with the task of self-determination, both of our be-
liefs and of our actions. It is a task that requires a degree of vigilance 
and self-command that is often beyond our powers. The need to 
maintain the fiction that we are always in control, both in our own eyes 
and in those of others, is a deep human drive. Think of the difficulty 
older people have in admitting they have dozed off for a moment. Or 
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the temptation to make an awkward physical movement look as if it 
were some sort of deliberate step. Or the temptation, in the heat of 
argument, to defend a thesis just because it has somehow fallen out of 
your mouth, and someone else has objected to it. Get a person to do 
some odd action under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, and 
then ask him why he did it. He will not say "I do not know." He will 
make up a plausible story and tell himself as well as you that that is what 
he had in mind. The use of rationalization to conceal our failures of 
self-determination in thought and action from ourselves is all of a 
piece with these things, an attempt to maintain the appearance of per-
fect self-command. 
1.4 Implications of the .KiJntian Conception for Egoism 
In this paper I am not going to argue for the stronger version of 
the Kantian conception of rationality, the version that derives the con-
tent of rational principles from the very idea of self-determination. But 
I cannot resist mentioning one ramification of that view for rational 
egoism. I hope that you can at least see how someone might be 
tempted to think that the categorical and hypothetical imperatives are 
principles that capture the very essence of self-determination. But it 
is not even remotely plausible to suppose that the egoistic principle cap-
tures the very essence of self-determination. That is, it is not plausible 
to think that you only succeed in exercising self-determination if you 
aim to maximize the satisfaction of your desires; or that you are not 
really willing at all unless what you will is maximum satisfaction. If we 
accept the stronger version of the Kantian conception, then the ego-
istic principle simply seems to be tlte wrong sorl of thing to be a princi-
ple of practical reason. To put the point in somewhat more 
old-fashioned Kantian terms, the egoistic principle is concerned with 
the content of the will, not with the very fonn of willing. 
But as I said, I do not propose to argue for the stronger version of 
the Kantian conception here. I do mean to argue, however, that in 
order to get the normative "ought" we need to see the principles of 
reason, as Kant does, as principles that describe mental activities, and 
not just the effects of judgments on the will. But even this weaker ver-
sion has important implications for the way we conceive of rational ego-
ism. For if we accept it, there are certain elements of Kantian moral 
psychology that we must accept along with it. 
In Kantian moral psychology, the mind determines itself by oper-
ating in accordance with a rational principle on certain items that are 
given to it. The rational principle is descriptive of the mind's activity, 
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of what it does with the items given to it. In the case of practical prin-
ciples, some of these items have a prima facie motivational force: they 
present a possible action to the will as eligible. Kant calls such a mo-
tivational item an "incentive." Desires, in Kant's view, function as in-
centives. So every willed action involves both an incentive and a 
principle: something presented to the will, on which it then acts. If a 
desire directly caused a person to act, there would be no contribution 
from the agent's own activity or self-determination, and so it would not 
be a case of volition. Suppose that an agent experiences a desire, and 
acts on it. To the extent that the agent determines himself, he takes 
the desire to be a reason to act; and that is not the same as its causing 
him to act. We may represent this fact- the contribution of his own 
activity- by saying that it is his principle to do what he wants. The prin-
ciple describes his activity. If we want to reserve that troublesome word 
"motive" for what actually produces the outward act, then it is not quite 
right to say his desire is a motive. His desire is an incentive. His mo-
tive is, speaking very roughly, that he takes the desire to be a reason. 
This has two implications. The first is that rational egoism is not 
the same as the thesis that only desires are motives. In fact it is in-
consistent with that thesis. If desires produced human actions di-
rectly, without tl1e intervention of principles, we would not be practically 
rational in any sense, egoistic or otherwise. 21 The second implication 
is less obvious. It is that rational egoism is not the same as the thesis 
that only desires are incentives. It is also inconsistent with that thesis. 
I can most easily bring out the reason for this by means of a com-
parison. As an intemalist, Kant supposed that the moral law applies 
to us only if respect for law can serve as an incentive for the will. The 
reason is simple. Suppose that your principle is to act only on a maxim 
that can serve as universal law. Suppose also that, with some ordinary 
desire serving as the incentive, you formulate a maxim that turns out 
to be incompatible with that principle. Wanting to spend the day at 
the beach, you are tempted to break your promise to help your neigh-
bor paint his house on the first sunny day. You test your maxim, it is 
rejected, and you therefore do help your neighbor to paint his house 
as you had promised. If rational action always involves both an incentive 
and a principle, what is your incentive for doing that? What presents 
"keeping your promise" to your mind as an eligible action? According 
to Kant, it is respect for law, the moral law's operation as its own in-
centive. In other words, the thought that you are required to keep a 
promise can itself serve as the incentive for keeping it. This is what 
Kant means by being motivated by pure practical reason - tl1at the 
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thoughts generated by the rational principle can serve as incentives 
for the will. 
In a similar way, if there is an egoistic principle of practical reason, 
it must be capable of generating an incentive of its own, an incentive 
for doing those things which we must do if we are to maximize our sat-
isfactions, and which we do not othenvise want to do. Suppose for in-
stance you arc tempted not to go to the dentist, since you are afraid 
of the drill. Let us suppose that the egoistic principle says that you must 
go, since the your desire to avoid the toothache ahead gets a higher 
normative ranking than your desire to avoid the drill now. It is no use 
insisting that the incentive you act on when you conform to the ego-
istic principle is your desire to avoid the toothache ahead, for if that 
were a sufficient incentive to get you to go to the dentist, you would 
not have been tempted to violate the egoistic principle in the first place. 
To suppose that your desire to avoid the toothache ahead is, after all, 
strong enough to overcome your fear of the drill is to revert to a ver-
sion of the first assumption about rationality I criticized. It is to sup-
pose that the role of practical deliberation is to uncover the psychological 
facts, to show you that you already, deep down, prefer to brave the den-
tist than to face the toothache later. We have seen that that assump-
tion is not warranted. Your incentive must rather be provided by the 
thought that it is better for you overall if you go to the dentist. So ra-
tional egoism is not compatible \vith the view that only desires can serve 
as incentives. Only completely wanton action is compatible with that. 
Rational egoism requires the possibility that we can be motivated by 
pure practical reason, in exactly the same way that morality docs. It is 
only what it tells us to do that is different. 
1.5 The Realist Egoist 
We have seen that the egoistic principle cannot be reduced to the 
instrumental principle. If it is a rational principle at all, it must be a 
principle in its own right. If it is to be a normative principle, associ-
ated with a normative ought, the egoistic principle must describe a ra-
tional activity. So in order to determine whether the egoistic principle 
is a normative principle, we need a way to identify rational activities. 
The stronger version of the Kantian conception, which tries to derive 
the content of rational principles from the very idea of self-determi-
nation, gives us one way of doing that, but we have seen that it is not 
a promising route for the egoist to take. The remaining option seems 
to be a form of realism. Just as realists think that following the prin-
ciples of logic and the canons of evidence is guiding yourself in mat-
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ters of belief by the aim of achieving the True, so they may think that 
following the principles of practical reason is guiding yourself in mat-
ters of action by the aim of achieving the Good. A person's happiness 
is her own good, so of course it is normative for her. Or perhaps it is 
just plain good, and so normative for us all. 
Now it is important to see that by itself, this sort of move does not 
get us to rational egoism. Suppose that we say that a person's happi-
ness is good for her (or just good, it does not matter for this argument), 
meaning that maximum satisfaction is good for her. It seems natural 
to give one of two explanations of what makes happiness in this sense 
good. The first is that the satisfaction of each of her desires is a good 
thing for her, so that by maximizing her satisfactions she is maximiz-
ing good things. The second is that her happiness is good because she 
in fact desires it, and so good for her for the same reason that each of 
the objects of her particular desires is good for her. In whichever of 
these ways we establish the goodness of happiness, we get the result 
that each of the person's particular desires has the same kind of nor-
mative claim on her that her happiness does. So if the aim of maxi-
mizing satisfaction comes into conflict with the aim of satisfying one 
of her desires, she now has a normative reason to do each of these things, 
and she needs some further reason to prefer the maximum satisfac-
tion to the particular satisfaction. The problem of why she should be 
prudent, which before seemed to be a problem about whether there is 
a normative principle of prudence, has simply reappeared in the guise 
of a conflict among a plurality of normative principles. 
Now perhaps you will agree that this problem does arise for some-
one who claims that happiness is good because we desire it, and there-
fore places happiness exactly on a footing with the other objects of desire. 
But you may be tempted to think it does not arise for someone who 
claims that happiness is good because the satisfaction of each of her 
desires is a good thing, and therefore that happiness is a maximum of 
good things. For it is obvious that a maximum of good things is bet-
ter than any one good thing, on the principle that more is better. But 
recall that we are not claiming that satisfaction is the only thing you 
want for its own sake, so we are not talking here about getting more 
of the only thing you want. You also want the particular objects of your 
desires. So the trouble with this argument is that it does not explain 
the authority ofthe egoistic principle, but rather simply asserts it. The 
imprudent person is not denying that he will get more satisfaction if 
he acts prudently- he is asking why he therefore has a reason to do 
so, especially since he may have to give up something else he wants.22 
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There is one final move available to the realist egoist, though. Ear-
lier I claimed that behind instrumental egoism stands a certain psy-
chological thesis, namely the thesis that people only really want what 
is consistent with their happiness. The realist egoist can transform 
this thesis into a view about what is really good. He can say that only 
the maximum com possible set of the objects of a person's desires, and 
the various objects that are parts of that set, are really good. So only 
those desires whose satisfaction is consistent \\ith happiness have nor-
mative standing, and others do not. By turning that thesis into a the-
sis about the good, rather than a thesis about real desires, the realist 
egoist escapes the problems I mentioned earlier. He avoids the charge 
of domesticating human psychology, since he is no longer making a 
psychological claim. And he also avoids the charge of emptying the 
principles of practical reason of their normative content, by making 
us incapable of disobeying them. He is not claiming we can be moti-
vated only by the good, for we have non-normative desires that also 
move us. 
But he avoids these charges at the cost of ghing up the view that 
the egoistic principle is a principle of naturalistic construction, and em-
bracing in its place a pure form of dogmatism. For now the good is 
not constructed out ofitems regarded as naturally or prima facie good. 
The realist egoist can no longer explain the goodness of happiness in 
terms of the goodness of satisfying desires, in either of the ways I men-
tioned above. For now he has embraced the view that not every satis-
faction is good, and more generally that not everything a person 
desires is good. This form of egoism is a top-down version, which tells 
us that it is prima facie rational to be motivated by our desires only be-
cause the maximum com possible set of their objects is the Good. 
On this view, the good for a person just is the maximum com-
possible set of his desires. This is not because the maximum compossible 
set is necessarily what lte wants most, for we have dropped the assump-
tion that an agent always actually prefers his happiness to any particu-
lar desired end, in order to secure the normativity of the egoistic 
principle. Nor is it because it includes most of what he wants- for we 
have dropped the assumption that an agent's wanting something is in 
itself the source of a normative claim, in order to avoid generating a 
plurality of normative claims that will conflict with that of the egoistic 
principle itself. The claim that the maximum com possible set of one's 
desires is the good is therefore a dogmatic claim. The answer to the 
question why you should be prudent is simply that prudence is the pur-
suit of the maximum com possible set and that just is your good. This 
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position appears to be logically unassailable, but that is no reason to 
pass out cigars. All dogmatic positions are logically unassailable. 
So egoism is a dogmatic rationalist view, which derives the normativity 
of its principle from a substantive conception of the good. Let us now 
look more closely at this conception. 
U. The Content of the Egoistic Principle 
11.1 Balancing and Particularity 
I want to begin this part of the paper by saying something about 
the intuitive ideas that the egoistic principle is meant to capture. By 
way of approach to one of these ideas, notice that there is widespread 
agreement that reason requires us to take the means to our ends. But 
many people believe that this by itself does not capture the demands 
of instrumental reason. Surely we should take the most efficient 
means, and there are problems about how those are to be specified; 
and of course there are the notorious problems about how to handle 
risk when we are pursuing ends under uncertainty. Many people think 
of solving these problems as part of working out the correct formula-
tion of the instrumental principle. 
Actually, however, these problems are generated by the same very 
basic idea that also seems to stand behind the egoistic principle. To 
formulate this idea, I will use the word "project" as a neutral term for 
anything that gives you a reason, whether it is a goal you are pursuing, 
a principle you live by, a cause you adhere to, your standing concern 
for the welfare of a friend, or whatever. I will speak of "promoting pro-
jects" and ask you to remember that promoting a project need notal-
ways involve pursuing a goal. The basic idea I have in mind is that you 
have more than one project and rationality requires you to take into 
account the impact which promoting one project will have on the oth-
ers. Considerations of efficiency and caution spring from this idea in 
a generalized form: if you have reason to minimize your expenditure 
of time and resources, it is for the sake of your other projects, not for 
the sake of the project you are promoting right now. 
I am going to call this basic idea the requirement of balancing -
meaning that whenever we make a choice, we are required to balance 
the reasons stemming from the project we are now pursuing against 
the reasons stemming from our other projects. 23 The idea that there 
is a requirement of balancing is an important element in egoism, but 
there is nothing inherently egoistic about it. The belief in egoism also 
seems to import another idea, which is that the overall good you are 
pursuing or constructing when you engage in this balancing is partie-
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ularly your own. I am going to call that idea the idea of particularity. 
The familiar ambiguity in the term "prudence" picks up both the ideas 
of balancing and particularity: people are described as prudent when 
they remember to attend to interests they will have in the future as well 
as the ones they have now, and also when they seem to be especially 
attentive to their own good.24 
There is room for disagreement about how exactly the egoistic prin-
ciple captures the idea of particularity - about what it is that makes 
egoism egoistic. "What makes the successful pursuit of a project a part 
of my own good? Is it just that the project is mine, or is there some 
subset of my projects whose success constitutes "my own good"? Or is 
it rather something about the way the egoist proposes to meet the re-
quirement of balancing, which is by maximizing his own satisfaction? 
On the first of these options, the idea of particularity is supposed to 
be captured by the kind of items that go into the egoistic calculation 
-they are mine, my desires, my projects, my personal concerns. The 
egoist reasons from egoistic materials. On the second, the idea of par-
ticularity is supposed to be captured by the structure or form of ego-
istic deliberation: it is because satisfaction is the basis for assigning 
weights to the items in the egoistic calculation that egoism counts as 
a pursuit of the agent's own good. The egoist reasons about a general 
range of materials, but reasons in a specifically egoistic way. In what 
follows, I will examine each of these possibilities in turn. 
II.2 Reasoningfrom Egoistic Materials 
First, are the materials that go into egoistic reasoning somehow in-
herently egoistic? For instance, is the egoist pursuing his own good 
because the incentives on which the egoistic principle operates are his 
desires? The trouble with this thought is that the word "desire" either 
refers to a particular kind of incentive, or it does not. If the word "de-
sire" refers to anything that can se1ve as an incentive for the will, or 
perhaps we should say any incentive except those generated by the ego-
istic principle itself, then all of one's incentives arc trivially "desires," 
and nothing is added to the idea of balancing. On the other hand if 
"desire" refers to some particular kind of incentive, say those that are 
associated with appetite or pleasure, then we are owed an explanation 
of why the egoistic principle commands us to promote pr~jects grounded 
in this particular kind of incentive in preference to or at the expense 
of other projects. Whatever that explanation might be, it will not 
refer to the fact that the other incentives are not your own, but rather 
to the fact that the other incentives are not rU>sirf..s. There is no obvi-
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ous sense in which a principle like that is either rational or egoistic. 
A more tempting option is that it is not the bare fact that some-
thing is a desire but its content that is relevant. In his essay "Egoism 
and Altruism" Bernard Williams proposes that we can isolate a cate-
gory of egoistic desire by means of a device intended to isolate the con-
tent of a desire. The device is to represent the desire in this way: 
I want that ( .......... ) 
where what we put in the parentheses is a description of the desired 
state of affairs. Then we can say that a desire is egoistic if the self ap-
pears somewhere in that description: 
I want that ( ... .1 ...... ) 
Williams calls such a desire an I-desire. 25 
But actually this device does not seem to capture the intuitive idea 
of egoism. In fact what it seems to capture is rather the idea of nar-
cissism. For instance, someone in the grip of a pathological case of 
remorse or masochism might want that he should suffer. Or someone 
might want to be the author of some good thing of which he himself 
may never get the benefit, like someone who wants to be the one who 
discovers a cure for cancer. And then there are the desires we would 
most naturally formulate not in terms of "I" but in terms of "my own," 
like the godfather's desire that his own family should remain in power 
or the patriot's desire that his own country should be free. Or suppose 
an artist wants his own paintings to make the world a more beautiful 
place. Are these desires egoistic? They contain a self-reference, but 
they certainly do not all concern things that you want for )'OUrseifin any 
intuitive sense. Or course we could say that a desire is only egoistic if 
the person wants something good for himself but then we cannot use 
these desires to define the notion of a person's good. 
Nevertheless, let us suppose that the device does pick out a cate-
gory of egoistic desire. Now we must be careful to avoid a confusion. 
Psychological egoism, in one ofits many forms, is the view that human 
beings have only egoistic desires. Those who believe it usually also be-
lieve that all human projects are grounded in desire. If these things 
were true, you would always pursue things you wanted for yourself, and 
the requirement of balancing would require you to pursue your own 
overall good. But this would not be because it is rational to pursue 
your own good as such. The only rational element in this picture is 
the requirement of balancing, which is not essentially egoistic; the ego-
ism here is psychological. If the requirement of balancing has only 
egoistic materials to work on, it commands the pursuit of your own good 
by default, and not because a focus on your own good is rational. 
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So if the question of rational egoism is even going to come up, we 
must suppose that human beings have both egoistic and non-egoistic 
projects. Suppose you want things both for yourself and for others, 
and perhaps have some impersonal desires for states of the world in 
general. According to this view it is a requirement of reason that you 
should prefer those things you want for yourself to the things you 
want for others or impersonally, no matter how badly you want those 
other things. Why would this be rational? Do not be tempted by the 
thought that your I -desires are favored by reason because they are the 
ones directed to your own good. The claim here is not that you first 
form some conception of the good, and then form egoistic desires by 
applying it to your own case. If that is the way it is, the good is not a 
maximum of satisfaction, but something else altogether, which desire 
merely aims at. This version of egoism is rather the view that your good 
is constituted by the maximum com possible set of the objects of your !-
desires, whatever those happen to be, and e\•en if they include things 
like wanting yourself to suffer. 
That is not very plausible. But in any case it is not the route that 
most egoists take. Social scientific egoists, in particular, have insisted 
that they can be neutral about what sorts of elements may go into the 
maximum com possible set. If this is right, then what is egoistic about 
egoism must be the form of balancing that it directs us to do. It must 
be that it is the pursuit of satisfaction. 
H.J The Pur.suit of Satisfaction 
The view that we are to maximize the satisfaction of our desires is 
ambiguous, because the idea of "satisfaction" is ambiguous. "Satisfaction" 
may refer either to an objective or a subjective state. Objective satis-
faction is achieved when the state of affairs that you desire is in fact re-
alized. For instance, you want your painting to hang in the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, and it does. Obviously, you could achieve the satis-
faction of your desire in the objective sense without knowing anything 
about it: you may never know that your dream of artistic fame has been 
realized. Subjective satisfaction by contrast is a sort of pleasurable con-
sciousness that objective satisfaction obtains. You know that your pic-
ture has been hung in the Museum, say, and you feel good about it; 
you reflect on the fact with pleasure. Although subjective satisfaction 
is pleasurable, it is important to distinguish it from pleasure in gen-
eral; and in particular from pleasure that is caused by the satisfaction 
of a desire by any route whatever. 26 Egoism is not supposed to be the 
same thing as hedonism. Subjective satisfaction is a specific kind of 
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pleasure, pleasure taken in the knowledge or belief that a desire has 
been satisfied. 
Now someone who deliberates with the aim of achieving the max-
imum sense of subjective satisfaction over the whole course of his life 
seems to be in a recognizable sense egoistic. His conduct is governed 
by the pursuit of something that will be experienced as a good by him-
self. But there is a problem about saying that he is rational. Subjec-
tive satisfaction is the pleased perception of objective satisfaction and 
so is conceptually dependent upon objective satisfaction. And so, one 
would think, its importance must be dependent on the importance of 
objective satisfaction as well. There would be something upside down 
about thinking it mattered that you should achieve subjective satisfaction 
independently of thinking that it mattered that you should achieve ob-
jective satisfaction. You can see the problem by imagining a case in 
which they pull aparL John Rawls used to tell the following story in 
his classes. 
A man is going away to fight in a war, in which he may possibly 
die. The night before he leaves, the devil comes and offers him 
a choice. Either while he is away, his family will thrive and flour-
ish, but he will get word that they are suffering and miserable; 
or while he is away his family will suffer and be miserable, but 
he will get word they are thriving and happy. He must choose 
now, and of course he will be made to forget that his conver-
sation with the devil and the choice it resulted in ever took place. 
The problem is obvious. The man loves his family and wants them to 
be thriving and happy, and this clearly dictates the first choice, where 
his family thrives but he believes they do not. But the goal of achiev-
ing subjective satisfaction seems to favor the second choice, where he 
gets to enjoy the satisfaction of believing they thrive when actually they 
do not. So here we have rationality dictating the choice of a pleasing 
delusion over a state of affairs which the man by hypothesis genuinely 
cares abouL He must care about it, or he could not get the subjective 
satisfaction: that was Butler's poinL The pursuit of subjective satisfaction 
in preference to objective satisfaction can lead to madness, in the lit-
eral sense of madness: you can lose your grip on reality. 
So suppose instead that we take the claim that we should maximize 
our satisfaction to be a claim about objective satisfaction. Now we run 
into a new problem. The idea of maximizing objective satisfaction 
makes no obvious sense. Even supposing that we had some clear way 
of individuating and so counting our desires, nobody thinks that max-
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imizing objective satisfaction is rational if that means maximizing the 
raw number of satisfied desires, for everyone thinks that our desires 
differ greatly in their importance and centrality to our lives. Maximizing 
satisfaction must have something to do with giving priority to the 
things that matter more to us. So we need some way of assigning prima 
facie weights or measures of some kind to our desires or more gener· 
ally to our projects before we know how to maximize satisfaction. And 
these weights or measures must be based either on reason or on our 
psychology. 
Suppose first that the weights are grounded in reason: we ask how 
strong a reason, relatively speaking, is provided by each of our projects. 
There are two things we might mean by this. First, we may be asking 
how important the project is to our happiness, how much of a contri· 
bution it makes. As I have already suggested, when I talked about the 
dangerous word "interest," the egoist cannot use this measure going 
in to his calculations, for it is precisely this measure that is supposed 
to emerge from his calculations. Finding out how to maximize satis-
faction is supposed to tell him which projects he must give priority to 
if he is to be happy. Second, we may be asking how strong a reason 
the project provides by some other rational measure, some measure 
that may derive in part from rational considerations or convictions other 
than those springing from the egoistic principle itself. For instance 
one may hold the view that reasons deriving from morality or, say, friend-
ship are weightier than reasons deriving from personal comfort. 
Roughly speaking, the measure of a project's importance is given by 
how good a reason there is to promote it. Provided we have a theory 
of practical reason rich enough to assign such measures, this is certainly 
an intelligible procedure. But it is not egoistic, for this is simply the 
procedure of determining what we have most reason to do. In other 
words, this is simply the requirement of balancing, taken all by itself, 
and in its most starkly formal sense. Furthermore, and importantly, if 
we are going to allow the initial measures to renect rational consider-
ations, we must leave it open whether it will turn out that balancing 
will take a maximizing form or not. For perhaps some reasons are un-
conditional and some are not, or perhaps some arc by their nature lex-
ically prior to others. If these things are so, balancing requires us to 
take them into account. Balancing is a matter of maximizing only if 
we start with items that vary only in a raw commensurable weight. 
So if we are to get a distinctively egoistic principle, and not just the 
requirement of balancing, it seems as if tlte initial weights we assign 
to our pr~jecto; must be based on something psychological, something 
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about our own attitudes towards them. An initial temptation is to tum 
back to the idea of subjective satisfaction, which may seem like the rel-
evant sort of quantum. Although we can agree that it is objective sat-
isfaction that matters, the test of how much it matters is subjective: that 
is, it is how much subjective satisfaction we would experience if we knew 
that the desire were objectively satisfied. But the problem of the con-
ceptual dependence of subjective satisfaction upon objective satisfac-
tion again arises. Surely the degree of our subjective satisfaction 
should depend on how important the objective state of affairs is to us, 
and not the reverse. Subjective satisfaction cannot serve as an inde-
pendent measure. 
This means that the measure must be provided by some subjectively 
identifiable or anyway psychological quantum other than the degree 
of satisfaction. In other words, it has to be something roughly along 
the lines of in tensity of desire. In this case egoism is normally misde-
scribed, for conformity to the egoistic principle will really lead to a max-
imum of satisfadion only on the hypothesis that the degree of subjective 
satisfaction exactly corresponds to the intensity of the desire which gets 
satisfied This was indeed the assumption of the British empiricists who 
originally brought us this theory. "Every affection," Hume declares, 
"when gratified by success, gives a satisfaction proportioned to its force 
and violence. 27 We need not linger over the question whether that is 
true, because it is inessential to the theory. The essential idea is that 
egoism is egoistic because the measure of a desired object's prima facie 
weight is how badly you want iL It is as if adding up all the intensities 
of your particular desires produces, in the case of the maximum com-
possible set, a single desire for the set as a whole with such a high de-
gree of intensity that it transmutes into normative force. 
However that may be, the use ofintensity of desire as the measure 
means that the egoist cannot have the neutrality he often claims about 
the kinds of items that go into the calculation. In fact a dilemma faces 
the egoist here. On the one hand, we may allow the items that go into 
the calculation to get their initial weights from any source, including 
normative sources such as personal commitments or the other prin-
ciples of reason. The gives us the desired neutrality, but in that case 
what is supposed to be the egoistic principle is really just the require-
ment of balancing, and the form that that requirement takes will not 
necessarily be a maximizing one. Or we may insist that the items 
going into the calculation are items of a quite particular kind, psy-
chological items with a measurable intensity or some other intro-
spectively accessible psychic magnitude that reflects our personal 
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attitudes. Then we get egoism, but we do not get the desired neutrality. 
To this extent, the egoistic principle cannot after all be detached from 
its origins: it is a child of introspective psychology, grounded in the 
British empiricist theory of happiness or the good. 
Conclusion 
Let me now sum up my conclusions. Egoism is not consistent with 
instrumentalism or ·with the view that human beings are motivated only 
by desires. Like any substantive theory of what it is rational to do, ego-
ism requires the possibility of motivation by pure practical reason. 
The egoistic principle differs from the categorical imperative by hav-
ing a different content, not by the kind of motivation it involves. The 
egoistic principle tells us that we must treat a certain conception of 
the good as having normative authority over our conduct. This con-
ception of the good is not philosophically neutral, nor is it merely the 
result of imposing a little order on the natural prima facie goods that 
it starts from. In fact, if the arguments of both parts of this paper are 
correct, egoism must be based on a rational intuition that happiness 
as it was conceived by the British empiricists is the Good, and is there-
fore the source of a normative principle. I therefore think that Niet-
zsche was right in the Twilight of the Idols when he dismissed rational 
egoism as a myth. Man docs not pursue happiness, at least as happi-
ness must be conceived by the rational egoist. Only the Englishman 
docs that. 28 
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pression of romantic metaph}-sics in the most literal sense, and it is tempting to specu-
late that its influence on Anglo-American philosophy springs from Hegel. The distinction 
that Aristotle and Kant make between theoretical and practical reason is elided by the 
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of judgments on the mind. The first assumption seems to me to be more commonly 
made about practical reasoning than about theoretical reasoning, and made as a way 
of making all reasoning seem theoretical. But a.~ I will suggest later, 1 think tile second 
assumption is commonly made about both kinds of rea.'i(>ning. This makes me think 
the two errors may have separate sources. 
15. In "Korsgaard on Choosing Non-Moral Ends~ (Elhic.s, Volume 109, No. I, Octo-
ber 1998) Hannal1 Ginsborg argues that Kant's \iew is that we are free to act against our 
happiness only when tile moral law demands it. There arc cenainly pass."lges in his work.~ 
that can be taken to support that \iew. But I do not sec how it can be squared with the 
claim that we "act under the idea of freedom. • Admittedly, the foundatimml argument 
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ity- the moral law applies to us because we have free will, not the reverse. For more 
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tarian must grant that each person's happiness is the source of a nonnati\•e claim. Again 
what we get in the first instance is a plurality of nonnative principles, one for each per-
son's happiness, and one- assuming that adding makes sense- for the total. Someone 
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is asking why he therefore has a reason to give up his ovm happiness, which the utili-
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23. Is the principle of balancing, taken by itself, a principle of reason? Let me first 
back up. In both TM Sourus of Nonnativity and 'The Nonnativity of Instrumental Rea-
son • I argue that the principle of instrumental reason is nonnative on the grounds that 
it is a constituth-e principle of willing. I mean this in a strong sense of constitutive: there 
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II above). is ;uguing that satisfYing the passion of benevolence makes at least as much 
of a contribution tn your own happiness as satisfying a lt•ss altruistic desire. Like Uut· 
lt•r, Hume goes on tn tl1row l"t•rtain plea~ures into the calnalation along with that pro· 
portional satisll~etion-thc inun~·diate feeling of benevolt•IJCt', which ht· so1ys is "sweet, 
smooth, tender, and agreeable" (p. 282). till' pleasing consdousncss that WI' have dont• 
well, and so forth. The argunll'nt is hedonistk, and satisfat·tion is thrown as one oftht• 
rclt·\~1111 pleasun·s; and yl't it follows from the argument that we could not get the sal· 
isfaction if Wt' acted for tht• sake of the satisl:tction mi/U'T thtm for the sake of helping 
the other. Ifthisargumenl W!'rc intended to motivatc an agcnl, authentic hene\·olencc 
amlthc desir!' li1rone's own sollisfaction and pleasure would ha\'t• to be nun hi ned some· 
how in the agt,lll's motivation. With a theory of volition such as 'the Kantian account 
described in this paper, wc might explain hnw this combination is possible. The b~·­
nevolent person dr~irt's the other's good for its m\'n sak~·. hut he rhomr~ to act on that 
desire rather than some otlll'r dt•sirc bccaust· of it~ special ;uh·antages. But Hume ancl 
Butlcr do not have a theorv ufvolition, so their accounts leave it undcar how we could 
be moved at one and the ~am~· moment hy the desire lin· another's good and the dt·· 
sire for our own. I do not consider this to he a problem for Hume. since in his cast· I 
think the argumelll is not intended to moth·ate: its aim is mther to establish congm-
cncc between the moral and the self-interestt·d points of,·it·w. (See Charloue Brown's 
unpublished papt·r "Hume Against the Sl'lfish Schools amlthe Monkish Virtues, "and 
my own accoulll in T/uo SortJu., t~fNmmaliTJity (Cambridgc: (:ambridge University Press, 
19!111), Sections 2.2.'1·2.2.7. pp. !i0-ti6.) But it ma)' be a problem for Butler. 
28. The argument of this paper may lcaw the reader with a pair of rl'l;ul'd worries. 
First, one man.-onderwll\', if the idea of rationall'goism is as nmfused as I h;l\'e dainwd. 
the temptati;m to belie\·~ in the egoistic prindple is so strong and so JWrcnnial. St•c-
nml, and morc importantly. <lilt' may wonder where the argument lt•a\'t's thc idea of 
happiness or the individual human good, and the rationality of pursuing that good. I 
han· not discussed hedonism much in this paJ)CJ', butlikt· many of my re;ull'J's I do not 
find it plausible, at lea~t in its modem, Ut•nthamite limn. Bm if we rejet'l both hedo· 
nism and the dcsirc·satislactionmodcl, it may seem as ifwt· are left with only a kind of 
"extcrnal realist" conception of the individual's good or happint·ss. On such a nmception, 
the good is sonwthing defim,d independently of the individual's natural desires and ca-
pacities for imer~·st ;md enjoymt·lll. This st•t•ms absurd. sinn· most of us believe that a 
~·rson 's good or lmppines.~ must he somt·thing turessm'if\' ,.;,pable of moti\<Uing, inter· 
esting, or pleasing him. And of course thert· is a connection hetwl'en thesc two wor-
ries, for the unpalatability of t'Xt~·rnal realism about happint·ss or a person's good has 
sonwthing to dn with the pert•nnialtemptation to belie\'l' in cgoism. To do justin, to 
tht•se questions would requirt• another papt•r, and it is a topic I hope In lake up on some 
future occasion. For now I will onl\' indicate wllt're !think tlu· answer li~·s. The anci~·nt 
(;n·eks, especiall~· Aristotle, olli.·r ,; conception of the human good which is psycholog-
icallygroundt·d, but which cannot be identilit•d \\;th eitlwr thc desire-satisfaction mmlcl 
or Uenthamitt• hedonism. Thl' rough idea is that happiness n·sts in the cxrcllent activ· 
33 
ity of our healthy faculties, an activity that we necessarily experience as ple;ummble, al-
though not because it is the cause of a pleas;1nt sens;uion. I bclic\"e some version of this· 
conception can be shown&o be much more plausible tlmn its modern, less sophisticmed, 
altcmath·cs. Sec Aristotle's Niromad1tml l:"thiaand the discussion of pleasure and pain 
in 111e Soum-s of Nonnali1lil)" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Sections 
-1.3.1-4.3.10, pp. 145-153. 
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